Despite a proposal to postpone the date of its effectiveness, a long-anticipated amendment to family law entered into force on 1 January 2026—Act No. 268/2025 Coll., which amends selected provisions primarily of Act No. 89/2012 Coll., the Civil Code, and Act No. 292/2013 Coll., on Special Court Proceedings (“ZRS Act”). The amendment introduces a number of changes—some of which may appear merely cosmetic, while others are rather substantial. Its objectives are to make divorce proceedings more efficient and faster, eliminating unnecessary formalities, and also to reduce conflict, particularly in cases involving minor children. It is based on the premise that a child has the right to essentially equal care by both parents and that parents’ rights to care for the child carry equal weight; accordingly, it formally abolishes the distinctions among exclusive, alternating, and joint care, emphasizes agreement, and protects a peaceful status quo through the principle of “less state; more competent parents.”
We have previously outlined the main points of the amendment. Now, after the amendment has entered into force and with the first, truly fresh practical experience, we will take a closer look at the changes and present a multi-part series on this topic.
Today, in Part 1, we will focus primarily on the changes in divorce proceedings themselves. The follow-up parts of the series will address mainly the new regulation in regards to child care and, above all, an entirely new measure—the “interim decision in family matters”.
Key Changes in Divorce Law as of 2026
- “Agreed divorce” — a new term and conditions
The amendment introduces the official statutory term “agreed divorce” for cases in which spouses agree on the divorce and on all mandatory related matters such as arrangements for minor children and settlement of property matters, including housing and eventual post-divorce maintenance. These cases were previously referred to as “uncontested divorces”).
As regards the substantive legal conditions for divorce defined in the Civil Code, aside from the deletion of the condition that the spouses must have lived apart (i.e., not shared a household) for at least six months—a condition that was commonly stated by parties as fulfilled in practice but in reality could hardly be verified by courts—the requirements have not changed significantly compared to the previous “uncontested divorces.”
Thus, for an agreed divorce it remains necessary that at least one year has passed since the marriage was concluded, the spouses consistently state the marriage has broken down and that they intend to divorce, that they agree on the arrangements concerning a minor child for the period after the divorce, and that they also conclude an agreement on the settlement of marital property, housing, and eventual post-divorce maintenance. This “property” agreement must be in writing, and requires the officially certified signatures of both spouses.
From a procedural perspective, however, the amendment brings a significant shift, for several reasons. First, the law expressly provides for a joint petition filed by both spouses; although such joint petitions were occasionally used in practice, they had not been expressly regulated by law, and it was more common—even in uncontested divorces—for the other spouse to join the petition.
More importantly, the ZRS Act now expressly allows a marriage to be dissolved without hearing the parties in person, and thus, in principle, even without holding a hearing, or possibly at an “other court session” (“jiný soudní rok”). Previously, the possibility to proceed without a personal hearing of the parties was permitted only exceptionally, when conducting such a hearing would involve great difficulties. Now, it will essentially be the rule, provided that the spouses’ consent to the divorce and their agreement as to a permanent, deep, and irreparable breakdown of the marriage are proven to the court in written submissions or by consistent statements of the parties at a less formal other court session, and the court has no doubts as to their authenticity and truthfulness. It remains to be seen how this rule will be implemented in practice, because although the ZRS Act expressly regulates the possibility to not hear the parties, this does not automatically mean that the court may also decide without holding a court hearing. Nevertheless, already in the first week of the amendment’s effectiveness, we found it useful to submit a statement by the spouses with officially certified signatures—where the court cancelled a hearing that had already been scheduled and pronounced the divorce, not only without hearing the parties but also without holding a formal court hearing at all. In that case, however, it was a divorce where the arrangements concerning the minor child had already been completely resolved.
By contrast, the possibility for courts to decide without holding a hearing even in agreed divorces where it is necessary to decide on the arrangements concerning minor children—although the parents are agreed on all aspects and submit their agreement to the court—does not have explicit support in the amended legislation.
Under Section 398a of the ZRS Act, however, the court may hear the parties at an “other court session” (jiný soudní rok), i.e., in a less formal format; and if an agreement between the parents is reached at such a session, the court may decide without holding a formal court hearing even when the arrangements concerning a minor child are addressed. A certain theoretical loophole for a decision without holding a formal hearing as well as without an “other court session” in an agreed divorce including arrangements for minors might be Section 398a(2) of the ZRS Act, which refers to the second sentence of Section 389(1), allowing the hearing of the parties to be dispensed with; we are preparing to test this approach in practice. It is likely, however, that this provision will relate only to dispensing with hearing the parties on issues of the divorce itself, and that in cases involving minor children, the parents will probably still need to attend at least one court hearing or “other court session,” even if they agree on all issues. This conclusion is also supported by Section 10 of the ZRS Act, which remains unchanged. Under Section 10, if the parties conclude an agreement on the subject matter of the proceedings, the court draws up a record of such agreement, and until that record is signed by the parties, the agreement cannot be taken into account.
- “Contested” divorce
For a divorce that is not “agreed” (i.e., where the spouses fail to reach agreement on all of the mandatory aspects described above), the law introduces no new official term. In practice, the labels “contested” or “non-agreed” divorce will most likely continue to be used informally.
In this variant too, the evidencing process has been simplified. Previously, in “contested” divorces the court examined the causes of the marital breakdown. Under the new rules, the court determines only the very existence of a deep, lasting, and irreparable breakdown of the marriage; if proven, the court will dissolve the marriage even against the will of the other spouse, without examining the causes of the breakdown. This change should therefore simplify the divorce process and contribute to a de-escalation by eliminating fault-based disputes.
The causes of the breakdown will still be examined only on an exceptional basis—specifically, only if the spouse who does not consent to the divorce claims the existence of a ground to dismiss the petition under Section 755(2)(b) of the Civil Code, i.e., where the divorce would conflict with the interests of the spouse who did not predominantly contribute to the breakdown and would cause them particularly serious harm.
Of course, nothing prevents spouses from identifying the causes of the marital breakdown in the proceedings if they feel the need; however, such causes will no longer be relevant for the divorce decision itself. Conversely, in other proceedings (for example, in the settlement of the marital property of the spouses, especially in connection with unequal shares, or in decisions on post-divorce spousal maintenance), establishing fault for the breakdown may still play a role. For this reason, some parties may still raise and try to prove fault during the divorce proceedings, even though for the contested divorce itself, the court need not examine it.
Even when the spouses cannot agree on all aspects of the divorce—typically, for example, they do not reach agreement on property matters or do not wish to address them and leave the issue for later or directly to the statutory presumption of settlement, which is fairly common in practice—but they do agree on the divorce as such, they may still file a joint petition for divorce and request a divorce without an in-person hearing of the parties, provided that their consistent statements about the marital breakdown and intention to divorce are sufficiently proven to the court in written submissions.
For completeness, let us add that the amendment also softened the court’s duty to attempt reconciliation of the spouses—the court is now to strive for reconciliation only if it is expedient in light of the circumstances and the spouses are present at the hearing. Thus, there should no longer be formalistic questions and invitations by the court to reconcile in cases that are clearly hopeless.
- Joining divorce proceedings with proceedings on arrangements for minor children
Another major benefit of the amendment, as indicated above, is the joining of divorce proceedings with proceedings on the arrangements concerning minor children.
If the spouses have a common minor child, there will now be a single joint proceeding covering both the divorce and the decision on the arrangements concerning the child for the period after the divorce. The joining is automatic—by virtue of law. The court therefore usually does not have to decide on it expressly. The practical impact is that parents do not have to undergo two separate sets of proceedings as before, and the overall process is shortened. If the child-related arrangements have been clarified, the court may decide within the same judgment also on the divorce, and the waiting for the judgment on child arrangements to become final before scheduling the divorce hearing is effectively eliminated. This should bring further acceleration of the process and cost reductions.
The outcome of the joined proceedings will usually be a single judgment that includes both the ruling concerning the minor children as well as the ruling dissolving the marriage. However, the part of the judgment containing the ruling on the divorce will become final only when the ruling on the arrangements concerning the minor children becomes final. An appeal directed only against the ruling concerning the minor children will not allow one to circumvent the finality of the divorce. Thus, it continues to apply that until the child arrangements are finally resolved, the effects of the divorce do not arise, even if the court has already ruled on the divorce.
Although the joining of proceedings is essentially automatic, the law also counts cases where joining is not appropriate; then the court may exclude one matter for separate proceedings. For example, if it becomes apparent that hearing the divorce together with child care issues escalates the conflict between the parents, the court may “split” the proceedings. Even then, the divorce will not become final before the decision on the children becomes final.
The new regulation also covers cases where parents first file a petition concerning the child and only later file a petition for divorce, as was fairly common even previously. The two sets of proceedings will also be joined in such a case—provided that the divorce petition is filed before the first-instance court announces its decision in the child-care matter. If, on the other hand, the decision concerning the children has already been announced (even if it has not yet become final), the two proceedings will no longer be joined.
A general condition for both types of divorce remains that the divorce must not conflict with the interests of the spouses’ minor child for special reasons (Section 755(2)(a) OZ), typically, for example, in the case of a seriously ill child. The amendment, however, clarifies that the court will examine the child’s interests in this context only where necessary.
At the same time, there is a general reduction in the role of the guardian ad litem, typically OSPOD (the Social and Legal Protection Authority for Children), whereas previously its appointment for the child was automatic. Now—typically in agreed divorces, i.e., where the parents agree on the arrangements for the minor child—a guardian ad litem will generally not be appointed. However, the child must be instructed by the parents about the opportunity to request such appointment, and compliance with this duty must be at least evidenced to the court so that the court may grant the parents’ petition under Section 471(4) of the ZRS Act. We will address the procedural changes in proceedings concerning minors in more detail in Part 2.
- Change in local jurisdiction of the court in divorce proceedings
The new rule is that if the spouses have a common minor child, the court with jurisdiction for the divorce is the court of the child’s general residence, rather than the court determined by the spouses’ last common residence, as it was previously.
Divorces involving minor children will thus always be dealt with by the court that would have jurisdiction to decide on the care of those children. As a result, divorce matters will in principle be taken over by judges specializing in child-care (guardianship) agendas.
If the spouses do not have minor children, the local jurisdiction remains the same as before the amendment (the petition is filed with the district court in the district in which the spouses had their last common residence, provided one of them still resides there; otherwise, with the court of the respondent’s residence, or, as the case may be, the petitioner’s).
- Inadmissibility of appeals in certain cases
No appeal may be filed against a judgment dissolving the marriage if the divorce was granted on the basis of the consent of both spouses. Section 395 of the ZRS Act thus sets an exception to the general right to appeal—if a joint petition for divorce is filed, or generally if the court decided with the informed consent of both parties, an appeal is not admissible. This concerns primarily agreed divorces, and also applies to situations where both spouses ultimately express consent to the divorce during the proceedings. The idea is that there is no reason for someone to appeal a decision they themselves proposed or approved.
In practice, therefore, an appeal against a divorce judgment will not be possible in the vast majority of cases.
An appeal may, however, still be filed against the part of the judgment concerning the children or maintenance if one of the parents disagrees. Such an appeal will now be subject to a court fee, as we note below.
- Court fees for divorce
As of 1 January 2026, the court fees for divorce have also changed. For an agreed divorce, the fee remains at CZK 2,000. For a contested divorce, spouses will now pay a fee of CZK 5,000.
Previously, the fee was uniform (CZK 2,000) regardless of the type of divorce. For spouses who cannot reach an agreement, the proceedings will therefore be CZK 3,000 more expensive. However, if during the proceedings they come to an agreement on all aspects and meet the conditions for an agreed divorce, the court will refund CZK 3,000 to the person who paid the fee. This incentivizes spouses to find consensus and an amicable solution both before initiating proceedings and during them.
Proceedings on arrangements concerning a minor child remain, at first instance, exempt from court fees. Newly, however, a fee of CZK 3,000 has been introduced for filing an appeal in matters concerning the care of a minor child (e.g., an appeal against a decision on maintenance or care). The aim is to limit the abuse of appeals used to prolong the dispute.
- Contact details of the parties
The Act on Special Court Proceedings now requires that a petition concerning arrangements for minor children include the telephone numbers or e-mail addresses of the parties, if known. This detail will facilitate communication by the court (e.g., quick sending of information about a hearing or a request to supplement filings). If a petition concerning arrangements for minors is filed jointly with a divorce petition, the parties’ contact details need to be included in the petition.
- Conclusion
The changes effective from January 2026 are a step towards modernization and simplification of the entire divorce process. Spouses who are able to agree will be able to take advantage of the faster “agreed” divorce with minimal formalities, without unnecessary delays, and in principle with a lower fee. Even “contested” divorces should be simplified. Waiving the examination of the causes of marital breakdown should save time and emotional strain; simplification—and hopefully acceleration—can be expected primarily from procedural changes, especially the joining with proceedings concerning minor children, the possibility not to hear the spouses in person, and also the option not to appoint automatically a guardian ad litem in proceedings concerning children. Of course, not everything can be resolved by legislation. Where an intensified conflict between spouses or parents persists, any amendment can help only minimally. Overall, however, this amendment to family law is a step in the right direction.
In our next offering, Part 2 of the series, we will focus mainly on the new approach to arrangements for minor children—especially the child’s right to equal care by both parents and the principle that both parents’ right to care for the child carries equal weight, in the form of the complete cancellation of the terminological distinction among exclusive, alternating, and joint care, and the regulation of parental contact with the child, and other related issues.
